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The Faults in "Fair" Trials: An
Evaluation of Regulation 55
at the International Criminal
Court
ABSTRACT

Despite its reputation as a "provision of an exceptional
nature," Regulation 55 has become one of the most contested
procedural devices employed by the judges at the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Hailing from civil law tradition,
Regulation 55 permits the ICC to modify the charges against an
accused at any time-either during or after the trial-if
the
judiciary decides it cannot convict the accused on the original
charges. This use of Regulation 55 in three of the ICC's seven
trials has demonstrated that the ICC cannot effectively
safeguarda defendant's fundamental trial rights: the right to be
informed of charges, the right to present a defense, and the right
to be tried without undue delay. In order to protect these rights,
it is necessary for the judges of the ICC to adopt a strict
interpretation of the Regulation and refrain from invoking it
beyond the earliest stages of the proceedings. With its legitimacy
and legacy on the line, the ICC cannot afford to continue seeking
convictions at any cost-especially when this comes at the
expense of a defendant's trial rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In June 2004, the International Criminal Court (ICC) began an
investigation into the Ituri Province of the Democratic Republic of
Congo; conflict over natural resources and land between the Hema
and Lendu ethnic groups had ravaged the province for years.' After
finding sufficient evidence to suggest that he had commanded a
Lendu militia in a targeted attack against Hema civilians in the
village of Borgoro, the Prosecutor of the ICC opened a case against
Germain Katanga. 2 The Prosecutor charged Katanga with indirect coperpetration of several war crimes and crimes against humanity

1.
See Press Release, The Int'l Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation, ICC-OTP-20040623-59
(June 26, 2004) (on file with author); Case Information Sheet, Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (May 27, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.inticedocs/PIDS/
publications/KatangaEng.pdf [http://perma.cc/CM2J-SEYY9typeplf] (archived Oct. 11,
2014). See generally Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui at the International
Criminal Court: Background, INrT JUST. MONIroR, http://www.ijmonitor.org/germain-katanga

-and-mathieu-ngudjolo-chui-background (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) [http://perma.ccVA5N3QJB] (archived Oct. 3, 2014) (providing historical background and context of the
conflict in the Ituri Province).
2.
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant of
Arrest (July 2, 2007).
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under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute.3 After the Pre-Trial
Chamber confirmed these charges in September of 2008, Katanga
began preparing his defense against those charges. 4 During over two
years of trial, Katanga testified and defended himself against these
charges of indirect co-perpetration. 5 Six months after the closing
arguments, the Trial Chamber determined it did not have evidence
sufficient to convict Katanga of indirect co-perpetration and notified
the parties that it would consider a re-characterization of the charges
against Katanga pursuant to Regulation 55.6 Nearly a decade after
the initial investigation, and three years after the defense rested on
the initial charges, the ICC convicted Katanga on five counts of a
lesser mode of liability.7 Such use of Regulation 55 to change the legal
characterization of charges is not unique to Katanga. 8

3.
See id. (listing the war crimes and individual charges against Katanga); see
also Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui at the InternationalCriminal Court:
A Closer Look at Regulation 55 at the ICC, INT'L JUST. MONITOR (May 28, 2013),
http://www.katangatrial.org/2013/05/a-closer-look-at-regulation-55-at-the-icc/
[httpJ/perma.cc/
NSV7-DY9M] (archived Oct. 3, 2014) (discussing the original charges against Katanga
and Ngudjolo).
4.
Case Information Sheet, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (May 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
PIDS/publications/KatangaChuiEng.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5UV-AZDJ?type-pdfl (archived
Oct. 11, 2014). The judiciary of the International Criminal Court is divided into three
divisions: Pre-Trial Division, Trial Division, and Appeals Division. See Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 34, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Rome Statute], http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/RomeStatutEng.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YTG4-SFTQ?type=pdfl (archived Oct. 11, 2014) (defining the "[o]rgans
of the Court"). The Pre-Trial Division handles the first phase of judicial proceedings,
including authorizing investigations, issuing arrest warrants or summons to appear,
and holding a hearing on the confirmation of charges. See id. arts. 56-58 (defining the
role and functions of the Pre-Trial Chamber).
5.
See Case Information Sheet, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07 (May 27, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.intliccdocs/PIDS/publications/Katanga
Eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/CM2J-SEYY?type=pdfl (archived Oct. 11, 2014).
6.
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations
of the Court and Severing the Charges Against the Accused Persons, ¶ 6 (Nov. 21,
2012) [hereinafter Katanga Decision on Regulation 55] ("[T]he legal characterisation of
facts relating to Germain Katanga's mode of participation is likely to be changed . . . .").
7.
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Jugement
rendu en application de l'article 74 du Statut, 709-10 (March 7, 2014) [hereinafter
Katanga Final Judgment].
8.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08-2324, Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal
Characterization of the Facts may be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation
55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, ¶ 33 (Sept. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Bemba Notice
on Regulation 55] (quoting Regulation 55 as authorizing the Chamber to "change the
legal characterisation of facts"); see also Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal
Characterization of the Facts May be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation
55 of the Regulations of the Court, ¶ 27 (July 14, 2009) [hereinafter Lubanga Notice on
Regulation 55] ("Regulation 55(1) confers on the Chamber, in [the] final stage, the
power to change the legal characterisation of facts"); Anthony Diala, Victims' Justice
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The judges of the ICC increasingly rely on Regulation 55 to avoid
acquitting defendants. 9 However, this reliance has significant
consequences for a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial.' 0 As
evidenced by international customary law and the Rome Statute
governing the ICC,11 there are few judicial foundations more
significant than the defendant's fair trial rights. The ICC must
recognize and ensure fair trial rights in order to maintain its
legitimacy.1 2 If the judges of the ICC continue to infringe upon both
the fair trial rights of defendants and the statutorily proscribed
power of the Prosecutor by re-characterizing the charges against the
defendant at various stages in the proceedings, the integrity of the
ICC is in jeopardy.' 3 This Note will evaluate the impact of Regulation
55 on fair trial rights in the ICC and propose several procedural
modifications to ensure the legitimacy of the ICC.
Part II details the relevant Rome Statute articles and ICC
Regulations at issue in this analysis. It also presents the historical
development of these governing documents within the larger context
of the ICC's procedural instruments and describes certain pretrial
processes critical to the analysis. Part III presents a comparative
examination of criminal procedure, emphasizing the key distinctions
between common law and civil law traditions on particular issues
relevant to Regulation 55 and the ICC. Part IV chronicles the most
recent ICC jurisprudence relating to Regulation 55 through an
analysis of the Katanga case. Part V details the major criticisms of
Regulation 55 and its impact on due process rights, namely a
defendant's right to be informed of charges, his right to prepare and
organize a defense, and his right to trial without undue delay. Lastly,
Part VI presents several proposals regarding the use of Regulation 55
by.the ICC Trial Chambers that would serve to emphasize the role of
efficient pretrial processes, minimize the use of Regulation 55, and,

and Re-CharacterizingFacts in the Lubanga Trial at the ICC, 7 EYES ON THE ICC 59,
59 (2011) (describing the issuance of a change in "the legal characterization of the
facts" under Regulation 55(2) by Trial Chamber I in the case against Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo).
9.
See, e.g., Bemba Notice on Regulation 55; Lubanga Notice on Regulation 55.
10.
See Diala, supra note 8, at 59 (describing the Lubanga case, in which Trial
Chamber I altered the charges against the accused under the authority of Regulation
55).
11.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 67.
12.
See, e.g., Sara Anoushirvani, Comment, The Future of the International
Criminal Court: The Long Road to Legitimacy begins with the Trial of Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, 22 PACE INT'L L. REV. 213, 214 ("In light of ... the Tribunal's insistence
upon upholding the principle of a defendant's right to a fair trial, the ICC has taken
one step forward in establishing itself as a legitimate judicial institution.").
13.
See Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, Minority Opinion of Judge
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶¶ 1-2, 53-54 (arguing that implementation of the recharacterization was "fundamentally unfair and . . . violated several of the accused's
most fundamental rights," including extension of the accused's waiver of the right to
remain silent beyond its permissible scope).
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most importantly, ensure the effective protection of the due process
rights of the accused.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The InternationalCriminal Court (ICC)
In 2002, 122 countries ratified the Rome Statute and established
the ICC as the first permanent treaty-based international criminal
court to end impunity for the perpetrators of "the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community," namely genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.1 4 The Rome Statute governs
the ICC.' 5 An investigation by the ICC Prosecutor may be initiated by
referral from any of the 122 ratifying countries, referral from the
United Nations Security Council, or authorization from a Pre-Trial
Chamber upon request by the Prosecutor.1 6 The judicial organ of the
ICC is composed of three divisions: Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals
Divisions.1 7 The Pre-Trial Division manages the first stage of judicial
proceedings, which includes authorizing investigations, authorizing
arrest warrants or summons to appear, and conducting a hearing to
confirm charges.' 8 At the end of the confirmation hearing, the case
will be assigned to a Trial Chamber for trial.' 9 The judges of the Trial
Chamber conduct the subsequent proceedings and determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. 20 Both the Prosecutor and the
defendant have the power to appeal decisions made during the course
of proceedings in both the Pre-Trial and Trial Divisions to the
2
Appeals Division. 1

14.
See INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, FACT SHEET: THE ICC AT A GLANCE 1 (2011)
[hereinafter ICC FACT SHEET], available at http://www.ice-cpi.intlicedocs/PIDS/publications/
ICCAtAGlanceEng.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4C3-4SDW?type-pdfl (archived Oct. 11, 2014).
15.
See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.ice-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to
%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) [http://perma.ce/CWM8-VZK7
?type-image] (archived Oct. 11, 2014).
16.
See ICC FACT SHEET, supra note 14.
See id.
17.
18.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 56-58 (providing for the "[r]ole of the
Pre-Trial Chamber in relation to a unique investigative opportunity," "[fjunctions and
powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber," and "[ilssuance by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a
warrant of arrest or a summons to appear").
19.
See William A. Schabas, Article 61. Confirmation of the Charges Before
Trial, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUE
732, 744 (2010) ("Once the charges have been confirmed, the Presidency is required to
constitute a Trial Chamber and refer the case.").
20.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 62-76 (defining trial rights and
procedures).
21.
See id. arts. 81-82 (providing for appeals against decisions of acquittal,
conviction, sentence, and other decisions).
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B. PretrialProcess and Confirmation Hearing
Following the issuance of an arrest warrant and initial
appearances before the Pre-Trial Division, the defendant first learns
the full details of the nature, cause, and content of the charges as well
as the legal characterization of facts as presented by the Prosecutor
during the pretrial confirmation hearing. 22 The ICC has held eight
confirmation hearings in its first ten years of existence, some lasting
up to twenty days while another only four. 23
The confirmation hearing provided for in Article 61 serves as a
mechanism by which the Pre-Trial Division determines whether there
are "substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of
the crimes charged." 24 The Pre-Trial Division must evaluate and
assess the evidence in relation to the crimes and modes of liability
charged by the Prosecutor. 25 The Pre-Trial Division permits both the
Prosecution and defense to present evidence and examine witnesses,
although the burden of proof remains with the Prosecution. 26 On the
basis of the confirmation hearing, the Pre-Trial Division must
determine whether there are "substantial grounds to believe" the
defendant committed each of the crimes charged, which generally is
thought to include the mode of liability, or form of participation,

22.
See id. art. 61 (governing "[clonfirmation of the charges before trial").
23.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 30 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF [http://perma.cclVY3Q-UGUL] (archived Nov. 11,
2014) (rendering a decision on the confirmation of charges after a hearing lasting
twenty days); Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 1 12 (June 15, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf [http://perma.cc/7CM-43CQ] (archived Nov. 11, 2014)
(rendering a decision on the confirmation of charges after a hearing lasting four days);
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura & Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and
(b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 16, 398 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/icedocs/
doc/doc1314543.pdf [http://perma.cc/BQ9K-D958?type=pdfJ (archived Oct. 11, 2014)
(rendering a decision on the confirmation of charges after a hearing lasting fifteen
days); Prosecutor v. William Sanoei Ruto & Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/0901/11-373, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b)
of the Rome Statute ¶¶ 18, 282-367 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdoes/
doc/doc1314535.pdf [http://perma.cc/QA3P-NNRC?type=pdf] (archived Oct. 11, 2014)
(rendering a decision on the confirmation of charges after a hearing lasting eight days).
24.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 61(7).
25.
See Lubanga Case Background to Confirmation Hearing, INT'L BAR Ass'N,
http://www.ibanet.org/HumanRightsInstitute/ICCOutreachMonitoringfLubanga-case
Backgroundtoconfirmationhearing.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) [http://perma.cc/
H8H9-N9CP] (archived Oct. 12, 2014).
26.
See id. ("The purpose of the confirmation hearing is for the Prosecution to
show it has sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the
person committed the crime charged. The Defence can object to the charges, challenge
Prosecution evidence and bring its own evidence at this stage of the proceedings.").
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associated with each crime. 27 However, neither the Rome Statute nor
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence defines the criteria of
"substantial grounds to believe." 28 In The Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo,29 the Pre-Trial Division reviewed international
human rights jurisprudence, including European Court of Human
Rights judgments and those of the ad hoc tribunals, to conclude that
the Prosecution must present concrete proof to support its specific
allegations.3 o The confirmation of Germain Katanga's charges
followed the Lubanga interpretation of the standard.3 1
According to the Rome Statute, at the end of the confirmation
hearing, the Pre-Trial Division determines the next stage of the
trial.32 The Pre-Trial Division has one of three options at the close of
the hearing: (1) confirm the charges and submit the defendant to a
Trial Chamber for trial, (2) decline to confirm the charges, or (3)
adjourn the hearing and request the prosecutor to provide further
evidence or consider amending a charge.3 3 Once the Pre-Trial
Division has confirmed charges against a defendant, the Pre-Trial
Division refers the case to a Trial Chamber for trial. 34 Once charges

27.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 61(7); see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Francis
Kirimi Muthaura & Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute,
¶¶ 428-30 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.ice-cpi.intliccdocs/doc/docl314543.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8VYW-3HZNtype-pdf] (archived Oct. 12, 2014) (reaching conclusions as to confirmation
of the charges against the accused with respect to both the requirements of the
substantive offenses charged and the modes of liability asserted). At the ICC, the
modes of liability applying to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are
planning, instigating, ordering, committing, aiding and abetting in the preparation or
execution of a crime, joint criminal enterprise, superior or command responsibility, coperpetration, indirect perpetration, and indirect co-perpetration. See INT'L CRIMIflAL
LAw SERV., MODES OF LIABILITY: COMMISSION AND PARTICIPATION 4 (2009), available

.

at http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/docs/Module 9_Modesof_iability.pdf [http://perma.cc/
U6XG-AJRQ] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
28.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 61.
29.
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Jan.
29, 2007).
30.
See id. ¶¶ 37-39 ("[F]or the Prosecution to meet its evidentiary burden, it
must offer concrete and tangible proof demonstrating a clear line of reasoning
underpinning its specific allegations.").
31.
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 65 (Sept. 30, 2008) ("In
the current case, the Chamber sees no compelling reason to depart from its application
of the standard as established in the Lubanga case. .
See Rome Statute, supranote 4, art. 61(7).
32.
33.
See id.
34.
See Schabas, supra note 19 ("With the exception of amendment of the
charges, which remain the responsibility of the Pre-Trial Chamber until the beginning
of the trial, the Trial Chamber takes over authority for the case."); see also Prosecutor
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA8, Reasons for "Decision of the
Appeals Chamber on the Defence Application 'Demande de suspension de toute action
ou proc6dure afin de permettre la d6signation d'un nouveau Conseil de la Ddfense' filed
on 20 February 2007" issued on 23 February 2007, ¶ 6 (Mar. 9, 2007) ("Under the
provisions of article 61(11) of the Statute, upon the confirmation of the charges, the
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are confirmed, the parties traditionally begin their initial
preparations for trial relying on the confirmation hearing decision.35
C. GoverningInstruments of the InternationalCriminal Court
Several instruments, including the Rome Statute, 36 Rules of
Procedure and Evidence,3 7 Regulations of the Court,3 8 and
Regulations of the Registry,3 9 govern the substantive and procedural
framework of the ICC. 4 0 The Regulations of the Court merit
particular attention for this Note. Under Article 52(1), the ICC judges
have the authority to create the Regulations of the Court, which
address both internal and external routine functions of the Court.41
The first version of the ICC's Regulations of the Court was enacted on
May 26, 2006, four years after the creation of the ICC.4 2 The amended
version enacted in February of 2011 reflects the current Regulations
utilized by the ICC today. 4 3 The regulations address a range of issues
including, among other administrative matters, the composition of
the ICC chambers, the distribution of documents, and translation
requirements.4 4

Presidency 'shall constitute a Trial Chamber' and sequentially thereto transmit, as
provided in rule 130 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the decision as well as the
record of the proceedings of the Pre-Trial Chamber to the Trial Chamber.").
35.
See Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, Minority Opinion of Judge
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 37-40 (stressing that an accused should be required to
defend only against those charges specifically confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber).
36.
See generally Rome Statute, supranote 4.
37.
See generally Int'l Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N.
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B) (Sept. 9, 2002), http://www.ice-cpi.int/iccdocs/PlDS/legaltexts/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf [http://perma.cc/KCL5-EFLJ?type=pdfl (archived
Oct. 12, 2014).
38.
See generally Int'l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, U.N. Doc. ICCBD/01-03-11 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Revised Regulations] http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/50A6CD53-3E8A-4034-B5A9-8903CD9CDC79/0/RegulationsOfrhe
CourtEng.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3UP-BM7X?type=pdfJ (archived Oct. 12, 2014).
39.
See generally Int'l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Registry, U.N. Doc.
ICC-BD/03-01-06 (March 6, 2006) http://www.ice-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A57F6A7F-4C204C11-A61F-759338A3B5D4/140149/ICCBD_030106_Englishl.pdf [http://perma.cc/KVZ35SLK?type=pdfJ (archived Oct. 12, 2014).
40.
See Claus KreB, The Procedural Texts of the InternationalCriminal Court,
5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 537, 538-42 (2007) (describing the several instruments used to
facilitate the functioning of the International Criminal Court).
41.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 52(1) (providing authority to the
judges of the International Criminal Court to adopt regulations necessary to the court's
"routine functioning"); Kre3, supra note 40, at 540 (stating that the ICC's provisions
have "banned rule-making by judges to a considerable degree" but that ICC judges
"still possess the power to create the Regulations of the Court under Article 52").
42.
See Int'l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, U.N. Doc. ICC-BD/0101-04 (May 26, 2004), http://www.ice-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907EOD8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations of the Court_170604EN.pdf [http://perma.cclL8TXZWBW?type=pdf| (archived Oct. 12, 2014).
43.
See generally Revised Regulations, supra note 38.
44.
See, e.g., id. regs. 7, 21, 31.
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Regulation 55, entitled "Authority of the Chamber to modify the
legal characterization of facts," was adopted to determine whether
and to what extent the Pre-Trial Division judges and Trial Chamber
judges may "correct legal flaws" in the charges during trial.4 5 The
judges originally adopted, and the Assembly of States Parties
approved, Regulation 55 in 2004, and it has not since been
amended." Regulation 55 permits the judges to amend the legal
characterization of the facts against the defendant in order to more
accurately comply with the evidence presented on either the crime(s)
charged or form of participation alleged.4 7 Proponents of Regulation
55 are quick to emphasize its sub-regulations-particularly 2 and 3as effective procedural safeguards for the accused. 48 First, Regulation
55(1) limits the judges' ability to amend the charges to only the facts
and circumstances described in the charges or, if applicable, amended
charges. 4 9 Additionally, Regulation 55(2) requires the judges to give
notice of the possibility of such changes at an appropriate stage of the
proceedings and to give the parties the opportunity to present oral or

45.
See Carsten Stahn, Modification of the Legal Characterizationof Facts in
the ICC System: A Portrayalof Regulation 55, 16 CRIM. L.F. 1, 2 (2005) (noting the
"crucial importance" of this question for the functioning of the International Criminal
Court).
46.
See Revised Regulations, supra note 38, reg. 55.
47.
See id. The text of Regulation 55 provides:
1. In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may change the legal
characterization of facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or
to accord with the form of participation of the accused under articles 25 or
28, without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the charges
and any amendments to the charges.
2. If, at any time during the trial, it appears to the Chamber that the legal
characterization of facts may be subject to change, the Chamber shall give
notice to the participants of such a possibility and having heard the
evidence, shall, at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, give the
participants the opportunity to make oral or written submissions. The
Chamber may suspend the hearing to ensure that the participants have
adequate time and facilities for effective preparation or, if necessary, it may
order a hearing to consider all matters relevant to the proposed change.
3. For the purposes of sub-regulation 2, the Chamber shall, in particular,
ensure that the accused shall:
(a) Have adequate time and facilities for the effective preparation of his or
her defence in accordance with article 67, paragraph 1(b); and
(b) If necessary, be given the opportunity to examine again, or have
examined again, a previous witness, to call a new witness or to present
other evidence admissible under the Statute in accordance with article
67, paragraph 1(e).
Id.
48.
See infra notes 49-52. But see infra Parts V-VI (explaining the limitations
of Regulation 55's textual restrictions).
49.
See Revised Regulations, supra note 38, reg. 55(1).
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written submissions. 50 Regulation 55(2) also permits the judges to
suspend the hearing in order to allow the parties to prepare for the
proposed change. 5 ' Lastly, Regulation 55(3) specifically requires the
judges to ensure that the defense is afforded adequate time and
faculties to effectively prepare his or her defense and, if necessary, to
give the defense the opportunity to present additional evidence or
witnesses and reexamine previous witnesseS. 52 However, as this Note
will demonstrate in Parts V and VI, the textual restrictions in these
sub-regulations only work as such safeguards in theory.
Regulation 55 must be examined in light of the entire procedural
framework of the ICC, particularly Articles 61 and 74 of the Rome
Statute.53 Article 61 deals, in part, with the amendment of charges at
different stages of the trial. 5 4 Article 61(9) grants the Prosecutor the
authority to amend the charges against the defendant after the
confirmation of charges and before the beginning of trial.5 5 In such a
scenario, the Prosecutor must first receive permission from the PreTrial judges and provide notice to the defense. 5 6 A hearing must be
held in order for the Prosecutor to add charges or substitute more
serious charges than those originally confirmed.5 7 A hearing must
then be held to confirm any additional charges.5 8 After the trial has
begun, the Prosecutor may withdraw charges only with the
permission of the Trial Chamber.59 Additionally, Article 74 of the
Rome Statute provides the requirements for a Trial Chamber
judgment. 60 Specifically, Article 74(2) limits the decision to the facts

50.
See id. reg. 55(2) ("If, at any time during the trial, it appears to the
Chamber that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to change, the
Chamber shall give notice to the participants of such a possibility . . . .").
51.
See id. reg. 55(3) ("The Chamber may suspend the hearing to ensure that
the participants have adequate time and facilities for effective preparation or, if
necessary, it may order a hearing to consider all matters relevant to the proposed
change.").
52.
See id. (providing for the protection of the defendant's right to a trial
without undue delay and the right to prepare and organize a defense).
53.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 61, 74 (governing "[c]onfirmation of
the charges before trial" and "[r]equirements for the [Trial Chamber's] decision");
Revised Regulations, supra note 38, at 22 (referring to "its decision under Article 74").
54.
See generally Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 61 (containing provisions
addressing the amendment process at various stages of trial).
55.
See id. art. 61(9) ("After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has
begun, the Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after
notice to the accused, amend the charges.").
56.
See id. (mandating a notice requirement). The notice requirement helps to
ensure the defendant's right to prepare his or her defense.
57.
See id. ("If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges or to substitute
more serious charges, a hearing under this article to confirm those charges must be
held.").
See id.
58.
59.
See id.
60.
See id. art. 74 (providing requirements for attendance by judges, the form
and basis of decisions, and the secrecy of deliberations).
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and circumstances described in the charges and, if applicable, any
amendments to the charges. 61

III. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
REGULATION 55

A judge's unilateral decision to change the legal characterization
of facts at any stage of a criminal proceeding raises several
developmental issues in the field of international criminal law while
simultaneously highlighting some of the differences between the civil
law and common law approaches to criminal procedure. 62 While it
may seem unusual to grant such expansive authority to judges from a
common law perspective, this procedural device is not uncommon
among civil law jurisdictions. 63 This designation of power at the ICC
was the result of an inability to compromise among the delegates
from both civil law and common law traditions during the Rome
Conference. 64
Generally, common law judges may not unilaterally change the
legal characterization of the crime or crimes charged against a
defendant. 65 In most common law jurisdictions, a judge wishing to
make such an amendment must seek a formal alteration during the
trial stage.6 6 In most situations, if the defendant is found guilty of an
offense not specifically charged in the indictment, a common law
judge must not convict on that offense, subject to the lesser included
offense doctrine.6 7 In common law systems, the prosecutor possesses

61.
See id. art. 74(2) (limiting the Trial Chamber's inquiry to "evidence
submitted and discussed before it at the trial").
62.
See Stahn, supra note 45, at 3-6 ("One of the root causes of the absence of a
unified stance on the procedural treatment of changes in the qualification of crimes at
the [international] trial stage is a methodological divide, namely, a difference in
approach by common law and civil law jurisdictions.").
63.
See id. at 5 ("Civil law jurisdictions frequently enable the judge to qualify
the facts submitted by the Prosecution in a legally different format than the document
containing the charges, without requiring a previous amendment of the charges.").
64.
See id. at 4 (remarking that neither the Rome Statute nor the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence provide a "conclusive answer" to the question because "no
common solution could be reached, due to divisions over a feasible methodology to deal
with the problem of the legal re-classification of facts. This 'constructive ambiguity' left
the final say over the choice of concept in the hands of the judges of the Court.").
65.
See Gilbert Bitti, Two Bones of Contention Between Civil and Common
Law: The Record of the Proceedings and the Treatment of a Concursus Delictorum, in
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW:

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 273, 282 (Horst Fischer, Claus KreB & Sascha Rolf Liider
eds., 2001).

66.
See Stahn, supra note 45, at 5.
67.
See id. It should be noted that judges are permitted to convict a defendant
of a lesser included offense when different from the original crime contained in the
indictment. See id. ("[Common law c]ourts may convict an accused of lesser included
offences ... if the essential elements of the latter are included in the offence
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the primary authority to determine the charges against the
defendant. 68 The prosecutor does this by drafting an indictment and
having the indictment approved by a grand jury or by drafting and
filing an information.6 9
Perhaps unsurprisingly, civil law jurisdictions grant more
authority to the judges in determining an individual defendant's
charges in a particular case. 70 In these systems, there is an
assumption that the initial legal classification of a crime is not
binding. 71 A civil law prosecutor's legal classification of a crime is
instead a recommendation for the judge. 72 This initial assumption
lays the framework for a trial process characterized by a relatively
active judicial role in the determination of charges.7 3 Typically, civil
law jurisdictions permit judges to re-characterize the facts submitted
by both parties without a formal amendment. 74 While the procedural
details may vary among civil law countries, most jurisdictions provide
notice to the defendant of charges as well as an opportunity for the
defendant to present additional evidence. 75 These are recognized by
international standards of human rights as minimal procedural
safeguards. 76
charged.. . . But common law jurisdictions are reluctant to grant courts the discretion
to convict an accused for a crime with substantially different elements ... or a more
serious crime not specifically charged in the indictment.").
68.
See Jingbo Dong, Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal
Court: A Comparative Study, 2 CAN. CTR. Sci. & EDUC. J. POL. & L. 109, no. 2, June
2009, at 109, 110 (footnote omitted) ("In stark contrast [to the civil law system], under
[the] common law system, the officer charged with public prosecutions has absolute
discretion on whether a case will be carried forward, what the formal charges will be,
and even if the charges should be later dropped.").
69.

See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1015-17,

1041-44 (13th ed. 2012) (outlining procedural requirements for the screening of
charges in the United States); see also Dong, supra note 68, at 109 (discussing the
charging discretion of prosecutors in common law jurisdictions).
70.
See Dong, supra note 68, at 109 (describing how the prosecutor's discretion
is subjected to judicial control in civil law jurisdictions).
71.
See id. at 109-10.
72.
See Stahn, supra note 45, at 5 ("[The Prosecutor's legal classification of the
crime is merely a recommendation, while the judge is in charge of determining the
substantive content of the trial on the basis of the facts submitted by the parties.").
73.
See Dong, supra note 68, at 109-10 (identifying France, Germany, and
China as examples of the traditional prosecutorial role under civil legal tradition).
74.
See id. at 109-10 (emphasizing the role of the judiciary by describing how
the Prosecutor is not permitted to drop charges without judicial permission).
75.
See Stahn, supra note 45, at 6 (citing Austrian, German, Italian, and
French codes of criminal procedure); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE] Jan. 30, 1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBI.] as amended, § 265, para. 1
(Ger.) (prohibiting a change in legal reference without first affording the defendant an
opportunity to defend himself); MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] [C. CIV. PRO.] 1996, art. 312,
para. 4 (Japan) (requiring the court to suspend the trial for a period necessary for the
accused to prepare for a sufficient defense upon the request of the accused or his or her
counsel if the court deems an alternation may cause substantial disadvantage to the
defense).
76.
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 67(a), (e) (providing that, among
other "minimal guarantees" to which an accused is entitled, an accused "shall be
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Common law and civil law jurisdictions take divergent
approaches to the role of judges and, specifically, a judge's authority
to re-characterize legal facts, and there is no general consensus on
the proper role of judges at the international level.7 7 As the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
concluded in Kupre§kiW, after conducting a survey of the treatment of
judicial re-characterizations in different jurisdictions, "[i]t is
apparent ... that no general principle of criminal law common to all
major legal systems of the world may be found."7 8
There is a general international consensus on the bundle of
rights that composes those most essential for an accused. In
Kupredid, the ICTY noted that there existed "a general principle of
law consonant with the fundamental features and the basic
requirements of international criminal justice."7 9 These requirements
included two significant standards that are relevant in the analysis of
the ICC's use of Regulation 55: (1) "the requirement that the rights of
the accused be fully safeguarded" and (2) the requirement that the
prosecutor be afforded the means necessary to execute its functions
"efficiently and in the interests of justice."8 0
Drafters representing both legal traditions attempted to solidify
either a common law or civil law character for the Rome Statute and
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 8 ' During the Rome Conference,
the drafters of the Rome Statute considered the procedural treatment
of judicial re-characterization of crimes, but were unable to reach a
consensus on the issue.8 2 The drafters introduced multiple different
proposals on the issue of legal re-characterization of facts by the Trial
Chamber judges after the Confirmation of Charges. 83
The ICTY prosecutor, Portugal, and Spain, introduced proposals
that would permit a Trial Chamber re-characterization. 8 4 These
proposals would have allowed the Trial Chamber to unilaterally
entitled ... [t]o be informed promptly of the nature, cause and content of the charge"
and "to raise defences and to present other evidence admissible under [the Rome
Statute].").
77.
See Prosecutor v. Kupregki6 et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 728
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000) (noting "the lack of any
general principles of international criminal law" applicable to cases involving "an
erroneous legal classification of facts by the Prosecutor").
78.
Id. ¶ 738.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. ¶ 739.
81.
See Stahn, supra note 45, at 10-11 ("Several attempts were made to firmly
establish either a common law or a civil law methodology in the Statute or the RPE.
But none of the two approaches managed to gain full support among the State
parties.").
82.
See Bitti, supra note 65, at 284-86 (discussing proposals made during the
Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission).
83.
See id. (discussing the ICTY Prosecutor's Office proposal, which was
derived from the Kupregkie case, the Portuguese and Spanish proposal, the proposal
presented by the common law countries, and the French proposal).
84.
See id. at 284.
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recharacterize the form of participation so long as the parties were
85
notified and were provided the opportunity to make submissions.
Delegates who hailed from a common law tradition instead
recommended a Prosecutor re-characterization proposal that would
restrict the Trial Chamber to the charges contained in the indictment
and would permit only the Prosecutor to withdraw or substitute
lesser charges. 86 The delegates from civil law countries rejected this
proposal.8 7
A final proposal that would permit Pre Trial re-characterization,
presented by the French delegation, is the most similar to the current
version of Regulation 55.*88 This proposal granted the Pre-Trial
Chamber the authority to change the characterization of facts so long
as it maintained adequate safeguards for the defense. 89
Since the delegations to the Rome Conference were
representative of both civil law and common law traditions,
ultimately all initial proposals were rejected due to the disagreement
about the scope of authority exercised by the Trial Chamber judges.9 0
In 2004, at the time of the Fifth Plenary Session where the
Regulations of the Court were adopted, the majority of elected ICC
judges hailed from countries that represented the civil law
tradition. 9 ' Thus, Regulation 55 permits legal re-characterization of
facts with notice to the defense and the opportunity to make
submissions.9 2 While such procedural safeguards are laudable, it is
less certain that the ICC effectively utilizes such safeguards to ensure
that the defendant is afforded proper fair trial rights.

85.
See id. (allowing the Trial Chamber to "classify the particular form of
participation in an offence in a different manner under Article 25 (3) than that
contained in the indictment"). Common law countries rejected these proposals because
they were in contravention with their common law system in which judges are bound
by the indictment as drafted by the Prosecutor. See id. at 285.
86.
See id. (explaining that for the common law countries, the first two
proposals by the ICTY Prosecutor and Portugal "went much too far").
87.
See id. at 286.
88.
See id. (giving the Trial Chamber substantial discretion in qualifying facts
regarding the crime allegedly committed and form of participation in said crime).
89.
See id. (requiring only due notice and an opportunity to for the parties
make submissions). Like the others, no agreement was reached on this proposal. See
id.
90.
See HAkan Friman, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the
Investigative Stage, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 65, at 191, 208-09
(expanding on the lack of agreement and pointing out that the decision ultimately rests
with the ICC judges).
91.
See Results of the Election of the Judges of the International Criminal
Court, UNITED NATIONS, http:/legal.un.org/icclelections/results/judgesresults.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2014) [http://perma.cc/GXU3-UCVU] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (listing
the judges, first elected in 2003, who served at the ICC as of 2004).
92.
See Stahn, supra note 45, at 1 n.1 (describing Regulation 55 as "a
traditional civil law concept").
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IV. USE OF REGULATION 55 IN THE ICC

A. GeneralApplication of Regulation 55
In the ICC, Regulation 55 permits the Trial Chamber to modify
the legal characterization of facts at any time during the trial, even if
the resulting characterization is at odds with how the Prosecution
presented the evidence or how the charges were confirmed after the
confirmation hearing.9 3 For example, if the prosecution charges the
accused with directly committing a particular crime after the
confirmation hearing-for example, in the case of Germain Katanga,
25(3)(a) primary liability for crimes against humanity under the
Rome Statute-but the evidence later suggests that the evidence in
fact supports a different charge-25(3)(d) liability for being an
accessory of the crimes-the Trial Chamber can convict the accused
under the different charge.9 4 It is irrelevant that this new mode of
liability was not considered or confirmed during the confirmation
hearing.95
B. Aims of Regulation 55
Commentators, critics, and justices of the ICC have advanced
several purported objectives of Regulation 55.96 First, commentators

93.
See Jennifer Easterday, GermainKatanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui at the
International Criminal Court: A Closer Look at Regulation 55 at the ICC, INT'L JUST.
MONITOR
(May
28,
2013)
[hereinafter
Easterday,
Closer
Look],
http://www.katangatrial.org/2Ol3/05/a-closer-look-at-regulation-55-at-the-icl
[http://perma.cc/K7X4-ECA5] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (discussing the decision of the
Appeals Chamber in Katanga).
94.
See id.
95.
See id. ("According to the [Katanga] Appeals Chamber majority, the trial
chamber can give notice 'at any time during the trial' without limit, as long as it
provides the parties with the opportunity to make oral and written submissions about
the proposed change at an appropriate stage of the proceedings.").
96.
See, e.g., Diala, supra note 8, at 64-66 (citing an argument by the defense
in the Lubanga trial to the effect that the sole purpose of Regulation 55 is "to correct
legal qualifications that could otherwise invalidate investigations," and does not allow
the Trial Chamber to "incorporate qualifications not envisaged" by the prosecution);
Fiona O'Regan, Prosecutor vs. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo: The Cumulative Charging
Principle, Gender-Based Violence, and Expressivism, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1323, 1344-47
(2012) (stating that the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga "displayed a desire to restrict
the ambit of Regulation 55 and ensure that it would only be used in exceptional
circumstances to fulfill its primary function of 'clos[ing] accountability gaps"') (quoting
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the
Appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial
Chamber I of 14 July 2009 Entitled "Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and
Participants That the Legal Characterisation of the Facts May Be Subject to Change in
Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court", ¶ 88 (Dec. 8, 2009));
Stahn, supra note 45, at 13-16 ("[T]he adoption of the concept of the legal qualification
of facts . . . preserves the principle of the exclusion of an amendment of the charges
after the confirmation hearing, while providing the Trial Chamber with a flexible
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have advanced the prevention of impunity gaps as a primary purpose
of Regulation 55.97 In such scenarios, the use of Regulation 55 is
intended to avoid situations in which an accused is acquitted on a
premature legal technicality even though there is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that he or she has committed some crime within the
jurisdiction of the court.9 8
The drafters of Regulation 55 identified efficiency and judicial
economy as additional purposes of Regulation 55.*99 Regulation 55 can
prevent "overburdening ... judges with cases involving cumulative or
alternative charges" and "allow[] for more efficient, timely trials."10 0
Since trials at the ICC are already lengthy processes, the judges have
sought to avoid hearing the parties present and address evidence on
cumulative charges. 0 1 Thus, the judges have concluded that they can
use Regulation 55 to avoid the burden of cumulative charging. 02
Whether the use of Regulation 55 actually aids in an efficient trial
process will be addressed in Part VI.

V. REGULATION 55 IN THE KATANGA CASE

In September of 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the
Prosecution's charges against Germain Katanga, specifically crimes
interpretative device to correct legal flaws in the indictment within the confines of the
facts and circumstances described in the charges.").
97.
This argument was proposed by the Prosecution to the Appeals Chamber in
the Katanga case following the Trial Chamber's decision to change the charges against
the accused. See Jennifer Easterday, Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui:
Appeals Chamber Confirms Decision on PotentialCharges to Katanga Case, INT'L JUST.
MONITOR (Mar. 28, 2013), http://katangatrial.org/2013/03/appeals-chamber-confirmsdecision-on-potential-changes-to-katanga-case [http://perma.cc/W6GE-BUAJ] (archived
Sept. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Easterday, Appeals Chamber].
98.
See Easterday, Closer Look, supra note 93 (suggesting that Regulation 55 is
"meant to avoid situations where an accused is acquitted even though there is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction
of the court").
See Stahn, supra note 45, at 28.
99.
100.
See Easterday, Closer Look, supra note 93.
101.
See id.; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga Against the Decision of Trial
Chamber II of 21 November 2012 Entitled "Decision on the Implementation of
Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges against the
Accused Persons", 1 21 (Mar. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Katanga Judgment on Appeal]
(noting "the length, complexity and evidentially voluminous nature of the proceedings
that come before [the ICC]").
102.
See Easterday, Closer Look, supra note 93. This purpose was advanced by
the Pre-Trial Chamber in its decision in the Bemba case concerning cumulative
charges, where the judges rejected the cumulative charges presented by the Prosecutor,
relying on the fact that they could later amend the charges if evidence proved
otherwise. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 203 (June 15, 2009) [hereinafter
Bemba Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b)].
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against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed during the
Bogoro attack.1 03 Originally, Katanga was charged with "indirect coperpetration" of the crimes, along with his co-accused, Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui.1 04 Both defendants allegedly used separate militias to
carry out those crimes during the Bogoro attack.10 5 The Prosecution
claimed that the two codefendants had jointly planned and executed
the attack.1 0 6 In mid-December, Ngudjolo was acquitted on all
charges and released.10 7 The Prosecution has appealed this
acquittal.10 8
A. Trial Chamber II Invokes Regulation 55 DuringDeliberationsafter
the End of Trial to Modify Mode of Liability
Nearly six months after the end of trial, a majority of Trial
Chamber II informed the parties that it would re-characterize the
mode of liability for Katanga and sever his case from that of his coaccused.1 09 Specifically, the Trial Chamber would change the alleged
mode of liability from "indirect co-perpetration" to a lesser form of
liability under Article 25(3)(d)(ii) called "common purpose" liability.1 0
This change would allow the Trial Chamber to charge Katanga for
contributing to the crimes rather than being directly responsible for
them."' This new mode of liability would apply to all charged crimes,
except for those relating to the use of child soldiers. 1 2

103.
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 11-36 (Sept. 30, 2008).
104.
See id. ¶¶ 473, 487-94 (summarizing the prosecution's alleged mode of
liability and finding that "indirect co-perpetration" is a mode of liability "in accordance
with the Statute").
105.
See id. ¶¶ 11-36.
106.
See id. ¶ 33.
107.
See Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 1 516 (Dec. 18, 2012) ("[Tlhe Chamber is unable
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a link between the Accused and the children who
were in Bogoro on 24 February 2003.").
108.
See Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12,
Prosecution's Appeal Against Trial Chamber II's "Jugement rendu en application de
1'article 74 du Statut" (Dec. 20, 2012).
109.
See Katanga Decision on Regulation 55, supra note 6, IT 6-9 ("As this step
does not concern the Accused Mathieu Ngudjolo, the decision also severs the charges
against him.").
110.
See id. ¶ 7; Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(d).
111.
See Katanga Decision on Regulation 55, supra note 6, ¶ 26 ("The
recharacterisation ... considers that the Accused's contribution was intentional and
made with full knowledge of the group's intention to commit the crimes.").
112.
See id. ¶ 7. However, it is important to recognize that this notification by
the Trial Chamber is not a final decision but a notification that it is considering such a
change and a request for submissions about the proposed change. See id. ¶¶ 6-7, 5557.
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B. Appeals Chamber Upholds Trial Chamber's
Use of Regulation 55
On January 10, 2013, Katanga appealed the decision of the Trial
Chamber and asked the Appeals Chamber to suspend the decision.113
His defense argued that this decision would violate Katanga's fair
trial rights.11 4 Additionally, his defense asserted that such a
modification of charges violates the Rome Statue and falls outside the
scope of Regulation 55.115
A majority of the Appeals Chamber upheld the decision by the
Trial Chamber.11 6 The majority held that the Trial Chamber can give
notice of such a modification at any time during the trial, so long as it
provides the parties with an opportunity to make oral and written
submissions about the proposed change at an appropriate stage of the
proceedings."1 7 The majority acknowledged that the Trial Chamber
may not even realize the need for such a change until it is
deliberating its final judgment. 118 The majority also asserted that
prohibiting the application of Regulation 55 in this situation would
undermine the impunity gap objective of Regulation 55.119 If the Trial
Chamber could not invoke Regulation 55 at the deliberations stage, it
would have to acquit a defendant after an entire trial even if there
was evidence that clearly established the accused was guilty under a
different legal characterization of the facts.1 20
The majority did, however, recognize several concerns with the
decision of the Trial Chamber.121 Most importantly, the Appeals
Chamber acknowledged that, depending on how the Trial Chamber
conducts the additional proceedings, there was a material risk of

.

113.
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Defense's
Document in Support of Appeal Against the Decision on the Implementation of
Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges Against the
Accused Persons, ¶¶ 1-2 (Jan. 10, 2013).
114.
See id. ¶ 14 ("The Notice Decision was rendered at an inappropriate time in
the proceedings so as to be incompatible with Regulation and the minimum fair trial
guarantees contained in Article 67(1) of the Statute . . . .").
115.
See id. ("The proposed modification of the mode of liability from 25(3)(a) to
25(3)(d) falls outside the scope of Regulation 55 and Article 74(2) of the Statute . .
116.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, ¶ 106.
117.
See id. IT 17-18. (concluding that an "appropriate stage of the proceedings"
refers to the opportunity of participants to make submissions to the Court).
118.
See id. $T 21, 23 ("[The Trial Chamber may realise, upon carefully
analysing the material and evidence that was presented in its totality, that the legal
characterisation on the basis of which the charges were confirmed may be subject to
change.").
119.
See id. T 22.
120.
See id. ¶ 21.
121.
See id. ¶ 99 (expressing concern that the "Impugned Decision was rendered
almost six months into the deliberations of the Trial Chamber" and emphasizing the
need for the Trial Chamber "to ensure that the proceedings, taken as a whole, are fair
and expeditious").
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violating Katanga's fair trial rights.1 22 The Appeals Chamber
emphasized that the late timing of the Trial Chamber's decision could
violate Katanga's right to a trial without undue delay.1 23 However,
the majority noted that it was premature to assess whether
Katanga's fair trial rights have been violated because it could not yet
judge how much time would be added to the trial because of the
modification.1 24 The majority concluded that the Trial Chamber
would need to assess, for itself, whether a re-characterization at this
stage would violate Katanga's right to a trial without undue delay
and whether he was deprived of establishing a defense against this
new mode of liability.1 25
In his dissent, Judge Tarfusser agreed with the majority's
conclusions regarding the timing of the notice. 126 He believed that
Katanga's fair trial rights could be violated by the shift in the mode of
liability at issue here. 27 Judge Tarfusser asserted that Regulation 55
should be applied only in exceptional circumstances. 128 He argued
that Regulation 55 should only be invoked when there is a change in
the mode of liability from individual criminal responsibility under
Article 25 to command or superior responsibility under Article 28, or
vice-versa.1 29 Here, he argued, changing the mode of liability from
one subsection of Article 25 to another subsection is not actually a
permissible change of the legal characterization of facts under the
text of Regulation 55.13o Additionally, Judge Tarfusser considered
that the Trial Chamber's decision violated the policy animating
Regulation 55 because the Trial Chamber violated Katanga's right to
be informed of the charges in detail when it declined to confirm
whether it would actually be changing the mode of liability.1 3 Unlike
the majority, Judge Tarfusser asserted that the Trial Chamber must
32
give more detailed information in the first notice decision.1

122.
See id.
123.
See id.
See id. IT 98, 101 (noting that the Trial Chamber's decision did not provide
124.
much detail about the facts that it would rely on if the mode of liability were changed).
125.
See id.
See id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 1 1.
126.
127.
See id.
See id. ¶ 5-6 ("I believe that the adverse impact must be circumscribed, and
128.
hence be proportional, to the need to safeguard the right to an informed, and therefore
effective, defence.").
See id. ¶ 10.
129.
See id. $1 10-11 ("I take the view that no envisaged shift from one form of
130.
responsibility listed in respectively article 25 and 28 to another form included in the
same provision amounts to a modification in 'the legal characterisation of facts'
suitable of triggering the application of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court.").
See id. ¶¶ 24-27.
131.
See id. (arguing that "in giving notice of their intention to consider a re132.
characterisation within the meaning of regulation 55," the Trial Chamber should
"provide[ at the same time adequate information as to the factual and legal scope of
that change").
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C. Trial Chamber Convicts on Modified Charges after
Closing of Trial
Nearly a decade after the ICC opened its investigation, Germain
Katanga was convicted on five counts.13 3 Yet, these five charges were
not the same charges that were confirmed by the Pre-Trial Division
and argued during trial. 134 Although Katanga was originally charged
as an indirect co-perpetrator, the Prosecutor failed to present
evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant had possessed the
requisite control over a militia group to perpetrate such crimes.13 5
Instead, the Trial Court decided to re-characterize the facts and
circumstances presented at trial to convict on a lesser mode of
liability-that of a contributor or accessory. 136 In a controversial
opinion with both concurring and dissenting judges, the majority
determined it had not violated the defendant's fair trial rights by recharacterizing the charges against the accused.13 7 Judge Van den
Wyngaert issued a 170-page dissent in which she detailed the
infringements on Katanga's rights to undue delay and adequate time
and preparation for his defense.1 3 s

VI. CRITICISMS OF REGULATION 55
An examination of the Trial Chamber's use of Regulation 55 in
the Katanga case highlights the consequences of such a re-

133.
See Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, $ 1691.
134.
See id. ¶ 30 (referencing the November 21, 2012 re-characterization by the
Trial Chamber of the charges against Katanga from Article 25(3)(a) liability to Article
25(3)(d) liability); see also Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, ¶¶ 2-3
(providing in its procedural history of the case that the Trial Chamber issued its
Decision on Regulation 55 after the closing of the presentation of evidence).
135.
See Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, ¶$ 1417-21 ("[I]t has not been
demonstrated, first, that the Ngiti militia constituted, in February of 2003, a military
organization; and second, that Germain Katanga exercised, at that time, control over
that militia sufficient to constitute an exercise of control over the crimes for the
purposes of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute.") (translated by Lydia Ansermet).
136.
See id. at 709 (finding the accused "guilty, under Article 25(3)(d) of the
Statute, of complicity in the crimes committed on February 24, 2003") (translated by
Lydia Ansermet).
137.
See id. ¶ 1592 (concluding, upon review of the re-characterization of the
charges, that the trial was "conducted in a fair and diligent manner, in full respect for
the rights of the accused") (translated by Lydia Ansermet); Stephen Smith Cody, War
Criminal Accepts Conviction and Expresses Regret for Victims' Suffering: What About
Reparations?, WORLD POST (June 26, 2014, 1:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
stephen-smith-cody/war-criminal-accepts-convb5531391.html [http://perma.cc/TA98SUDLI (archived Nov. 11, 2014) (discussing Katanga's apology in the context of the
controversy surrounding the guilty verdict).
138.
See generally id. Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert.
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characterization on the defendant's fair trial rights. 3 9 The major
criticisms surrounding Regulation 55 emphasize the insufficient
protection afforded to the defendant's trial rights. 140 Article 67 of the
Rome Statute, entitled "Rights of the Accused," provides the
minimum guarantees that must be afforded to the accused before and
during the trial. 141 These rights of the accused, including the right to
trial without undue delay, the right to be informed of charges, and
the right to prepare a defense, reflect internationally recognized
human rights.1 42 While it is true that the language of the Rome
Statute and Regulation 55 recognize such procedural safeguards, it is
far from certain that these fundamental rights are adequately
protected in practice. 4 3
A. The Right to Be Informed of Charges
Article 67(1)(a) provides for the defendant's right to be informed
promptly and in detail of the nature, cause, and content of the
charges.1 44 This fundamental right has been preserved in nearly
every major human rights treaty, including Article 6(3)(a) of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 14(3) of

139.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101,
the alleged violations of Katanga's fair trial rights).

¶¶

59-105 (discussing

140.
See generally SUSANA SACOUTO & KATHERINE CLEARY, WAR CRIMES
RESEARCH OFFICE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAw, DEFINING
THE CASE AGAINST AN ACCUSED BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: WHOSE
RESPONSIBILITY IS IT? (2009) [hereinafter SACOUTO & CLEARY, DEFINING THE CASE],

available at http://www.wel.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/WCRO Report-on
DefiningCase_Nov2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/EAN8-GK9P?type=pdfJ (archived Oct.
17, 2014) ("Surely these [trial] rights would be more meaningful if the accused was
given some certainty over the charges on which he or she will be tried."); Diala, supra
note 8 (discussing the ICTY Trial Chamber's decision not to recharacterize the facts in
the Kupregkid case because it would "prejudice the rights of the accused to proper
notice of the nature of the charges against him").
141.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 67.
142.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Mar.
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing for the right of an
accused "[t]o be informed promptly ... of the charge against him," "[t]o have adequate
time and facilities for the preparing of his defence," and "[t]o be tried without undue
delay"); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention on Human Rights) art. 6, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889
[hereinafter ECHR] (providing for the right of an accused "to be informed
promptly ... of the accusation against him" and "to have adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of his defence").
143.
See Revised Regulations, supra note 38, reg. 55 (requiring notice to the
accused as well as adequate time and facilities for effective defense preparation); see
also Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalCriminal Courts and FairTrials: Difficulties and
Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 136-39 (2002) (reviewing the limitations on defense
at the ICTY and ICTR and suggesting that the ICC will have even greater difficulties
protecting the fair trial rights of the accused).
144.
See Rome Statute, supranote 4, art. 67(1)(a).
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the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).1 4 5
The primacy of this right has been emphasized in international
human rights jurisprudence. 146 This jurisprudence is particularly
relevant to the interpretation of Article 67 under the Rome Statute
due to Article 21(3), which provides that, "[t]he application and
interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with
internationally recognized human rights."1 47 Both the European
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights have found that Article 6(3) of the ECHR extends to the legal
characterization of the facts. 14 8 Particularly, in Pilissierand Sassi v.
France, the Court elaborated that "in criminal matters the provision
of full, detailed information concerning the charges against a
defendant, and consequently the legal characterization that the court
might adopt in the matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring
that the proceedings are fair."1 49
Proponents of Regulation 55 argue that Regulation 55 addresses
any infringement on the right to be informed of charges by the text of
sub-regulation 2, which requires the Trial Chamber to inform the
parties about the potentially changed legal characterization of
facts.150 However, as practice has proven, the Trial Chambers at the
ICC have invoked Regulation 55 at late stages in the trial process-in
one case, after the Prosecution had completed its case and, in a more
alarming case, after the end of trial.' 5 ' Even if the Trial Chamber
fulfills its obligation to provide notice to the parties about changing
the charges, it is too little, too late. 152 Both Prosecution and Defense

145.
See ICCPR, supra note 142, art. 14(3); ECHR, supra note 142, art. 6(3)(a).
146.
See, e.g., P61issier & Sassi v. France, App. No. 25444/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 51
(1999) [hereinafter P61issier case] ("The Court observes that the provisions of
paragraph 3 (a) of Article 6 point to the need for special attention to be paid to the
notification of the 'accusation' to the defendant.").
147.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(3).
148.
See P61issier case, supra note 146, 1 52. In these circumstances, the legal
characterization of the facts involves a determination as to whether the facts and
circumstances pleaded in the charges should be characterized as a different crime or a
different mode of liability than initially pleaded.
149.
P61issier case, supra note 146, 1 52.
150.
See Revised Regulation, supra note 38, reg. 55(2) ("If, at any time during
the trial, it appears to the Chamber that the legal characterisation of facts may be
subject to change, the Chamber shall give notice to the participants of such a
possibility . . . ."); see, e.g., Hans-Peter Kaul, Construction Site for More Justice: The
International Criminal Court after Two Years, 99(2) AM. J. INT'L L. 370, 377 (2005);
Stahn, supra note 45, at 19-20.
151.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, ¶¶ 2-4 (providing in its
procedural history of the case that the Regulation 55 recharacterization occurred after
the Trial Chamber had retired for deliberations); Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-2324, Decision giving notice to the parties and
participant that the legal characterisation of the facts may be subject to change in
accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, ¶ 5 (Sept. 21, 2012).
152.
See Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, Minority Opinion of Judge
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 40 ("By springing article 25(3)(d)(ii) at the end of the
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generally rely on the Trial Chamber's initial confirmation of charges
before and during the trial process to prepare their cases. 153 The bare
minimum protections provided in Regulation 55(2) provide scant
assurance that the defendant remains informed of the charges during
the trial. 154 By changing the mode of liability during or after the
parties have begun presenting their cases, the Trial Chamber judges
undermine one of the most fundamental due process rights.15 5
B. The Right to PrepareDefense
Article 67(1)(b) provides for the defendant's right to have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defense.1 56 This
right, like the right to be informed of the charges, finds substantial
support in the various international human rights treaties, such as
Article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR and Article 6(3)(b) of the ECHR.' 5 7 The
European Commission of Human Rights describes this right as "the
opportunity to organise his defence in an appropriate way and
without restriction as to the possibility to put all relevant defence
arguments before the trial court."15 8
Proponents of Regulation 55 believe that sub-regulation 3
provides a sufficient safeguard to protect this right.1 59 Regulation
55(3)(a) provides an express procedural protection for the defendant,
permitting the accused to seek suspension of the hearing in order to
prepare the defense or to seek a new hearing.160 Additionally,
Regulation 55(3)(b) provides the opportunity for the accused to
examine again a previous witness, to call new witnesses or to present
other admissible evidence. 16 1
trial, the Katanga Defence may have conceded, or less vigorously contested, certain
points of fact that it might have contested differently had it been properly informed."
(emphasis added)).
153.
See id. ¶ 26 ("[T]he purpose of formulating charges [in the Confirmation
Decision] is precisely to make clear which inferences are being alleged. . . .").
154.
See id. ¶¶ 60-67 (discussing the problematic implications for fair notice of
the Trial Chamber's decision to withhold notice until the close of evidence); see also
Revised Regulations, supra note 38, reg. 55 (providing that notice shall be given "at any
time during trial" (emphasis added)).
155.
See Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, Minority Opinion of Judge
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶¶ 60-70.
156.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 67(1)(b) (providing for the accused's
right "[t]o adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to
communicate freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in confidence").
157.
See ICCPR, supra note 142, art. 14(3)(b) ("Everyone shall be entitled
to . . . have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to
communicate with counsel of his own choosing."); ECHR, supra note 142, art. 6(3)(b)
(providing that an accused has the right "to have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence").
158.
Can v. Austria, App. No. 9300/81, Eur. Comm'n H.R., 1 53 (1984).
159.
See Revised Regulations, supra note 38, reg. 55(3); see, e.g., Hans-Peter
Kaul, supra note 150, 377; Stahn, supra note 45, at 20.
160.
See id. reg. 55(3)(a).
161.
See id. reg. 55(3)(b).
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However, even these express procedural protections do very little
to ensure that an ICC defendant has a right to prepare and organize
his defense in a meaningful way.1 6 2 For example, in Bemba, after the
defense had begun presenting its case, the judges of Trial Chamber
invoked Regulation 55 and gave notice to the parties of a potential
change to lower the knowledge requirement for the crimes charged.1 63
The defense objected to such a modification, arguing that this change
would require at least six to nine months of additional investigation
and time to prepare. 164 The defense sought leave to appeal this
decision on the grounds that the improper use of Regulation 55
violated a defendant's trial rights, but the Trial Chamber denied the
appeal.1 6 5 Unwilling to further delay an already lengthy trial, the
defense moved to recommence the trial. In this motion, the defense
maintained that, absent a formal decision to amend the charges or a
decision that Regulation 55 is being relied upon by the Trial
Chamber, re-characterization of the facts for a lesser mens rea would
result in actual prejudice.1 66 The Trial Chamber declined to render a
formal decision about the knowledge requirement it would impose on
the defendant, depriving Bemba of his right to notification of the
charges against him.1 6 7

162.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08, Defence Submissions on the Trial Chamber's Notification Under Regulation
55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, TT 27-32 (Oct. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Bemba
Defense Submissions] ("Given that the Defence case is already well underway, the
Defence has neither the time nor the resources to investigate and prepare to refute an
alternative theory of liability."). See generally infra notes 163-69.
163.
See Bemba Defense Submissions, supra note 162, ¶¶ 1-10 (explaining the
procedural history of the Bemba case prior to the Trial Chamber's invocation of
Regulation 55); Bemba Notice on Regulation 55, supra note 8, 15 (giving notice to the
parties of the Trial Chamber's desire to consider recharacterization of the charges
pursuant to Regulation 55(2)).
164.
See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Defence Request for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Temporary Suspension of the
Proceedings Pursuant to Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court and Related
Procedural Deadlines, T 6 (Dec. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Bemba Defence Request for
Leave] ("The Defence estimated that the minimum time necessary would be 6-9
months.").
165.
See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Public Redacted Version of "Decision on 'Defence Request for Leave to Appeal the
Decision on the Temporary Suspension of the Proceedings Pursuant to Regulation 55(2)
of the Regulations of the Court and Related Procedural Deadlines"' of 11 January 2013,
¶ 36 (Jan. 16, 2013) (denying the defense's request for leave to appeal); Bemba Defence
Request for Leave, supra note 164, T 20 (explaining the defense's proposed grounds for
appeal).
166.
See Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Defence Motion to Vacate Trial Chamber's "Decision on the Temporary Suspension of
the Proceedings" of 13 December 2012 and Notification Regarding the Envisaged ReQualification of Charges Pursuant to Regulation 55, ¶ 9 (Jan. 28, 2013).
167.
See id. T 12 ("Given the accused has received no valid, prompt and legally
adequate notification of any such allegation, the Defence cannot be required at this late
stage of the proceedings to prepare and answer the possibility of a different basis of
liability." (emphasis added)).
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C. The Right to Trial without Undue Delay
Article 67(1)(c) provides for the defendant's right to be tried
without undue delay.16 8 The trial process at the ICC is already
extensive and lengthy, compared to domestic legal systems and even
other international judicial bodies.16 9 Regulation 55 causes
unnecessary delays by requiring the both parties to make additional
submissions-after one or both parties have already presented
evidence during the confirmation hearing to confirm the charges. 17 0
Potentially, parties could be required to call new witnesses or reexamine previous witnesses, to perform new investigations, and to
hold new hearings.' 7 1 When such interruptions are instigated during
an ongoing trial and, especially, after the close of trial, Regulation 55
extends the trial process to the detriment of the defendant.1 72
It was nearly six months after the close of Katanga's two and a
half year trial, when a majority of the Trial Chamber notified the
parties that it was considering a re-characterization of the mode of
liability.' 7 3 Trial Chamber Judge Van den Wyngaert issued a strong
dissenting opinion in response to the majority decision, concluding
that the notice of a potential re-characterization threatens the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial hearing.1 74 Katanga agreed,
and appealed the Trial Chamber's decision, arguing that such a
decision violated his fair trial rights and indicated that the majority
was biased against him. 175 However, the majority of the Appeals

168.

See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 67(l)(c).

169.
See SUSANA SACOUTO & KATHERINE CLEARY, WAR CRIMEs RESEARCH
OFFICE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON
COLLEGE OF LAW, EXPEDITING
PROCEEDINGS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1, 11 (2011) [hereinafter
SACOUTO & CLEARY, EXPEDITING PROCEEDINGS], available at http://www.wel.american

.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/1106report.pdf (attributing such delays to the difficulty
of collecting evidence in conflict-prone countries, dislocated witnesses, translation
needs, the need to establish contextual elements of crimes, and the large scale of the
crimes at issue).
170.
See Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, Minority Opinion of Judge
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶¶ 13-14 ("I strongly believe that the length of these
proceedings is incompatible with the Chamber's obligation under article 64(2) to
conduct the trial expeditiously and with the accused's right to be tried without undue
delay under article 67(1)(c).").
171.
See Revised Regulations, supra note 38, reg. 55 (allowing the defense to
reexamine witnesses or call new witnesses and allowing the Chamber to suspend
hearings or call new hearings).

172.
See Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, Minority Opinion of Judge
Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶¶ 13-14 ("We must not lose sight of the fact that [the
accused], who has endured these delays whilst in detention awaiting verdict, has in no
way contributed to them." (citation omitted)).
173.
See Katanga Decision on Regulation 55, supra note 6.
174.
See id. ¶ 53 (characterizing the majority's decision as "incompatible with
Article 67(1)(a), (b), (c), (g), and (i)") (translated by Lydia Ansermet).
175.
See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Defence's
Document in Support of Appeal Against the Decision on the Implementation of
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Chamber concluded that the timing and the scope of the Trial
Chamber's decision fit within the framework of Regulation 55.176
Although the Appeals Chamber found that the use of Regulation
55 did not automatically violate Katanga's fair trial rights, it did
acknowledge that there was a risk of such a violation.' 7 7 According to
the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber could violate the
defendant's rights depending on how the additional proceedings were
conducted. 178 The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that the late
timing of the Trial Chamber decision could violate Katanga's right to
trial without undue delay. 1 79 Therefore, the majority stated that if
the Trial Chamber did decide to change the mode of liability against
Katanga, it is required to ensure that he still received a trial without
undue delay.18 0
Katanga conspicuously leaves open the question of what
constitutes "undue delay" in the eyes of the ICC. Considering that
Katanga was first charged six years before, any conception of "undue
delay" by the ICC is bound to be a narrow one.
D. JudicialExpansion of Power at the Expense
of the Prosecution
One significant line of criticism aimed at Regulation 55 focuses
on the judges' attempt to expand their control over proceedings by
improperly invoking the regulation.18 1 For example, following the
Lubanga trial before the ICC, critics condemned the use of Regulation
55 to add new charges against the defendant in the middle of the
trial.1 82 According to Dov Jacobs, who has written extensively about
the proceedings of the Lubanga case, both the Pre-Trial Division and
Trial Chamber improperly expanded their control over the case by
first amending, and then adding, charges.' 8 3 Jacobs emphasizes that

.

Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges Against the
Accused Persons (Jan. 10, 2013).
176.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, ¶f 85-105.
177.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, ¶ 89 (finding that the
Trial Chamber's measures adequately safeguarded the rights of the accused while
acknowledging the danger of violating such rights by way of a Regulation 55
recharacterization).
178.
See id.
179.
See id. ¶ 99.
180.
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 67(c) (providing that an accused is
entitled "[t]o be tried without undue delay").
181.
See, e.g., Dov Jacobs, Lubanga Decision Roundtable: Lubanga, Sexual
Violence and the Legal Re-Charaterizationof Facts, OPINIO JURIs (Mar. 18, 2012, 1:00
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/18/lubanga-decision-roundtable-lubanga-sexual-violenceand-the-legal-re-characterization-of-facts [http://perma.cc/MW4R-LJS3] (archived Oct. 4,
2014) ("The Judges, in their never-ending quest to maintain control over the
proceedings, included in the Regulations of the Court .. . a Regulation 55 allowing
them to legally re-characterize the facts . .
182.
See id.
183.
See id.
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under the text of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is "solely
responsible for choosing the charges and the underlying factual
elements." 84 Nothing in the Rome Statute or the ICC Rules of
Procedure and Evidence permits a role for the judges in this
determination because the drafters chose not to grant this power to
the judges, even though this process was discussed at the Rome
Conference.18 5 Thus the Rome Statute technically dictates that judges
should have no role in determining the content of the charges.1 8 6
In particular, critics argue that Regulation 55 infringes on the
power of the Prosecutor to amend charges under Article 61(9).187
Article 61 of the Rome Statute limits the actions of the Pre-Trial
Division to three options upon the completion of the confirmation
hearing.' 8 8 First, the Pre-Trial Division may confirm the charges for
which it has determined there is sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe the accused is responsible and then
commit the accused to a Trial Chamber for trial on the confirmed
charges.' 8 9 Secondly, the Chamber may decline to confirm those
charges for which it has determined there is insufficient evidence.1 9 0
The Pre-Trial Division has a third option if it is not persuaded of the
sufficiency of the evidence or it believes that the charges as presented
do not properly reflect the evidence.1 9 Under these circumstances,
the Pre-Trial Division may "adjourn the hearing and request that the
Prosecutorpresent more evidence or amend the charges."' 92 Under a
strict interpretation of Article 61(7) of the Rome Statute, the PreTrial Chamber can only exercise these three actions at the close of the
confirmation hearing, and the Prosecutor alone exercises the
authority to amend the charges. 9 s In support of this argument,
critics cite other provisions of the Rome Statute confirm that the
Prosecutor should enjoy the exclusive authority to frame the charges

.

Id.
184.
185.
See id. ("[W]hatever one thinks of the opportunity of judges having such a
power, the fact is that the drafters of the Statute and the RPE chose not to grant it,
and it was not the judges' decision to make to grant it to themselves . .
186.
See id.
187.
See, e.g., SACOUTO & CLEARY, DEFINING THE CASE, supra note 140, at 8-9
(arguing that while certain interpretations of Regulation 55 render it compatible with
Article 74(2), "any use of Regulation 55 might still violate Article 61(9)," which only
permits the Prosecutor to amend charges).
188.
See id. at 7-8.
189.
See id. at 1 ("[Tlhe Pre-Trial Chamber must confirm those charges in
relation to which it has determined there is sufficient evidence . . . and commit the
person to a Trial Chamber for trial on those charges.").
190.
See id.
191.
See id.
192.
Id.
193.
See id. at 6-8 ("Given the plain language of Article 61(7), as well as the
relevant drafting history behind the creation of the PreTrial Chamber, it is difficult to
understand the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber's finding," i.e., that a fourth option,
recharacterization of the facts, is available to the Pre-Trial Chamber).
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against an accused.1 94 Article 58(6) provides that an arrest warrant
may be amended only at the request of the Prosecutor.'9 " Article
61(9) directly states that charges may only be amended on the
initiative of the Prosecutor and with permission of the Pre-Trial
Division and only after the confirmation hearing.196 Article 74(2), by
inference, provides that the Trial Chamber may not sua sponte
amend the charges because the final judgment cannot exceed the
facts and circumstances described in the charges and amendments to
the charges.' 9 7

VII. SUGGESTED PROPOSALS
Although the ICC Appeals Chamber upheld the validity of
Regulation 55 in Katanga, the past application of this procedural
device has raised some serious concerns about its soundness in
practice. 98 This part advances three related proposals concerning the
use of Regulation 55 and the pretrial processes at the ICC that will
more effectively safeguard the due process rights of the accused. The
first proposal mandates a strict interpretation of Regulation 55,
permitting only changes to certain modes of liability. The second
proposal would restrict the judges' invocation of Regulation 55 to the
earliest stages of the proceedings so as to ensure the defendant
maintains his right to a trial without undue delay. The final proposal
suggests a more transparent and extensive pretrial process that
allows the defense to know the extent of the charges at the beginning
of trial.
A. A Strict Interpretationof the Changes for Which Regulation 55 May
Be Invoked
The history and adoption of Regulation 55 suggests that it is a
procedural device of a very unique nature.19 9 Considering the debate

194.
See id. at 7 (referring specifically to Articles 58(6) and 74(2)).
195.
See id.
196.
See id. ("Article 61(9) provides that, after the charges are confirmed and
before the trial has begun, the charges may only be amended on the initiative of the
Prosecutor and with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber.").
197.
See id.
198.
See, e.g., Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, ¶1 97-99
(upholding the Trial Chamber's implementation of Regulation 55 during the
deliberations stage of the trial proceedings but expressing concerns regarding the
potential for undue delay).
199.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Cuno Tarfusser, ¶¶ 5-9 (describing the regulation as one of an "exceptional
nature"); SUSANA SACOUTO & KATHERINE CLEARY, WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE,
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, REGULATION 55 AND THE

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 1, 43 (2013) [hereinafter Easterday, Closer Look], available at
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surrounding the adoption of the Regulation at the Rome Conference,
the application of this regulation should in all circumstances be
narrowly prescribed to the text of the Regulation.2 00 A strict
application of Regulation 55 is consistent with the treatment used by
the ad hoc tribunals-the ICTY and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)-in interpreting a comparable
procedural device that permits the court to "cure defects" in the
indictment. 20 1 Both the ICTY and ICTR have restricted the use of
such modifications to the most exceptional cases-those in which the
indictment was vague or ambiguous. 2 02 Even still, the judges of the
ICTY and ICTR mandated that the defendant have "timely, clear and
consistent information" that would be sufficient to provide adequate
notice to prepare a defense. 20 3
In accordance with this established jurisprudence, the ICC
Chambers could strictly limit the application of Regulation 55 to its
curative potential, and use it only in cases where the defendant
lacked the requisite notice and ability to prepare an adequate defense
based on the charges in the indictment-be it because of the
indictment's ambiguity or its lack of cohesion with the evidence.
Therefore, the altered charges under Regulation 55 would in fact give
the defendant the notice necessary to effectuate his right to prepare a
defense. 204 As Judge Tarfusser explained in his Katanga dissent, the
http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/Reportl7.pdf [http://perma.cc/
U56G-8R4U?type=pdfl (archived Oct. 18, 2014) (noting that despite its characterization
as a unique provision, "Regulation 55 has assumed a prominent role in the majority of
trials to come before the ICC to date.").
200.
See Bitti, supra note 65, at 284-86 (detailing the competing proposals
presented and rejected at the Rome Conference).
201.
See Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A,
Judgement, 1 20 (Aug. 29, 2008) ("[The principle that a defect in an indictment may be
cured is not without limits."); Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No.
ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, 1 325 (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Nahimana Judgement]
("[Ilt is possible to remedy ambiguity or vagueness in an indictment by providing the
defendant with timely, clear and consistent information detailing the factual basis
underpinning the charges.. . . [O]mitted charges can be incorporated into the
indictment only by formal amendment .... ); Prosecutor v. Andrd Ntagerura et al.,
Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgement, ¶ 114 (July 7, 2006) [hereinafter Ntagerura
Judgement] ("Although the Appeals Chamber allows that defects in an indictment may
be 'remedied' under certain circumstances, it emphasizes that this should be limited to
exceptional cases."); Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvodka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A,
Judgement, ¶ 33 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Kvo6ka Judgement]. See generally SACOUTo & CLEARY, REGULATION 55,
supra note 199, at 44-49 (recommending that use of Regulation 55 should be limited to
"[e]xceptional [c]ircumstances by [a]nalogy to the [a]d [h]oc [t]ribunal's [a]pproach to
'[c]uring' (d]efective [i]ndictments").
202.
See generally Nahimana Judgement, supra note 201; Kvocka Judgement,
supra note 201.
203.
Nahimana Judgement, supra note 201; see also Kvoaka Judgement, supra
note 201 (imposing the same "timely, clear, and consistent information" requirement).
204.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 1 23 ("Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court reflects the
right of the accused to be adequately informed of the charges . . . by providing, inter
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paradigm example of such an optimal use of Regulation 55 would be
in cases where the charges shift from those of individual
responsibility under Article 25 of the Rome Statute, to those of
commander responsibility under Article 28.205 Although Tarfusser
goes as far as to suggest that Regulation 55 is not triggered for shifts
among forms of responsibility within Articles 25 and 28 respectively,
his underlying rationale for the defendant's right to an expeditious
trial supports a convincing argument for an even more restrictive
interpretation of Regulation 55.206 Judge Tarfusser was concerned
about the Trial Chamber "unreasonably broadening the scope of
application of regulation 55" and made several recommendations to
ensure a defendant's fair trial rights, particularly a narrow

interpretation of Regulation

55.207

This restriction is entirely consistent with the language of the
Regulation, as adopted by the judges of the ICC and confirmed by the
Assembly of States Parties. 20 8 The language of Regulation 55 permits
a change the legal characterization of facts "to accord" with the
crimes listed in Articles 6, 7, and 8-genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, respectively-or "to accord" with the form
of participation of the accused under articles 25 and 28.209 Restricting
the Regulation's use to a strict "either/or"-to change the type of
crime charged, or to change the form of the actor's participation in the
crime between Articles 25 and 28-is in accordance with the policy
underlying Judge Tarfusser's dissenting opinion in the Katanga
Appeals Chamber judgment. 2 10 As Judge Tarfusser concludes, "both
alia, that the accused shall "[h]ave adequate time and facilities for the effective
preparation of his or her defence .... "); Ntagerura Judgement, supra note 201
(emphasizing that defects may be cured only in "exceptional cases," and that even
where an indictment's defects are "remedied in each individual instance," a reviewing
court "would still have to consider whether the overall effect of the numerous defects
would not have rendered the trial unfair in itself").
205.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Cuno Tarfusser, $$ 10-20 ("Regulation 55 only applies to changes to the form of
participation which require shifting from article 25 to article 28 of the Statute, and vice
versa.").
206.
See id. T 11 ("I take the view that no envisaged shift from one form of
responsibility listed in respectively article 25 and 28 to another form included in the
same provision amounts to a modification in the 'legal characterisation of facts'
suitable of triggering the application of regulation 55 . . . ."). His concern with this type
of re-characterization relates to its potential impact on the expeditiousness of the
proceedings. See id. ¶ 18.
207.
See id. T 6, 17.
208.
See Revised Regulations, supra note 38, reg. 55. Signatories to the Rome
Statute are States Parties that meet in the Assembly of States Parties as the
legislative body of the ICC. See ICC - Assembly of States Parties, INT'L CRIMINAL
COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/assembly/Pages/assembly.aspx (last visited
Sept. 23, 2014) [http://perma.cclP6XZ-QQY7] (archived Oct. 19, 2014).
209.
Revised Regulations, supra note 38, reg. 55 ("[T]he Chamber may change
the legal characterisation of facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or
to accord with the form of participation of the accused under articles 25 and 28 . . . .").
210.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Cuno Tarfusser, ¶ 10 ("In my view, a change in 'the legal characterization of
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the general principles governing the interpretation of the instruments
of the Court . .. and the overarching features of its proceedings make
it mandatory to restrictively interpret regulation 55 ... ."211 Any
looser interpretation would infringe on the defendant's right to be
informed of charges such that he can prepare a defense. 212
B. A Strict Limit on When Regulation 55 May Be Invoked
The current limitless use of Regulation 55 carries significant
consequences for a defendants' right to a trial without undue delay in
the ICC. 213 When such interruptions are instigated during an ongoing
trial and, especially, after the close of trial, Regulation 55 can
unnecessarily delay an already lengthy trial process to the detriment
of the defendant. 214 This is particularly true when a defendant must
request a stay in proceedings in order to call new witnesses and
prepare an additional defense strategy-i.e., in cases where the
charges in the indictment were not sufficiently ambiguous or
unsupported by evidence. 215 The ICC should consider restricting the
application of Regulation 55 only to the earliest stages of the
proceedings. While such a restriction would be within the judge's
discretion, it is reasonable to conclude that judges could make a
comprehensive evaluation of the fairness of any proposed changes. In
considering the impact of Regulation 55 on a defendant's fair trial
rights, the judges should consider the timing and sufficiency of the
notice, the length of the proceedings, the progress and depth of the
arguments, the potential delay in proceedings, and, ultimately,
prejudice to the defendant.
While acknowledging that it may be possible for a Trial Chamber
to invoke Regulation 55 in a way that consistent with the right to be
informed of the charges and prepare a defense, the use of Regulation
55 must be restricted to the earliest stages of the trial. The War
Crimes Research Office of American University suggests that the line
should be drawn before the Defense puts on its case and the accused
facts to accord with [. . ] the form of participation of the accused under articles 25 and
28' triggering the application of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court only
occurs when a Chamber envisages the possibility of switching from (any of the forms of
responsibility provided under) article 25 to (any of the forms of responsibility provided
under) article 28 of the Statute, or vice versa.").
211.
Id. ¶ 19 (evaluating the regulation in lights of the court's governing
instruments and the practices of the Trial Chamber).
212.
See id. ¶¶ 22-27 (discussing the impact of a loose interpretation of
Regulation 55 on trial fairness).
213.
See id. ¶ 18; see also Katanga Final Judgment, supra note 7, Minority
Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 14.
214.
See SACOUTo & CLEARY, EXPEDITING PROCEEDINGS, supra note 171, at 1,
11 (discussing lengthy trials that the ICC has conducted).
215.
See Katanga Decision on Regulation 55, supra note 6, Minority Opinion of
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, $T 48-52; see also Katanga Final Judgment, supra
note 7, Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶¶ 118-28.
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takes the stand.2 16 Otherwise, a late invocation of Regulation 55
inhibits the effectiveness and expeditiousness of any defense effort. 2 17
After spending years preparing and organizing a defense based on the
confirmed charges, the defense is unequivocally burdened by any
alteration in the charges during the trial-especially one that occurs
after the defense has rested its case. Thus, the judges should strictly
limit themselves to the earliest stages of the proceedings when
providing a Regulation 55 notice.
C. A More Transparent, Extensive PretrialProcess
One of the most common justifications for Regulation 55 is "to
enhance the efficiency of proceedings through the encouragement of a
precise charging practice from the very beginning of the
proceedings." 2 18 The Pre-Trial Division has emphasized judicial
efficiency as an essential justification for declining cumulative
charges. 2 19 However, the use of Regulation 55 has only served to
further delay especially lengthy proceedings, such as in Katanga
when the Trial Chamber once had to suspend trial for three months
in order to allow the Appeals Chamber to review the interlocutory
appeal filed after the Trial Chamber gave notice of its consideration
of Regulation 55.22o As the ICC jurisprudence to date has
demonstrated, the invocation of this regulation often necessitates a
reevaluation of defense strategy, since a shift in liability-even if
Regulation 55 is restricted to shifts between Article 25 and 28-will
contain distinct elements. If such invocation occurs at a later stage of
the proceedings, the time needed for additional preparation is even
greater.
In order to avoid the unnecessary delays inherent with the use of
Regulation 55, the Pre-Trial Division should require a more
transparent and extensive pretrial process. Currently, the
confirmation hearing, as evidenced by the frequent use of Regulation

216.
See SACOUTO & CLEARY, REGULATION 55, supra note 199, at 52 ("While it is
perhaps conceivable that a Trial Chamber could invoke Regulation 55 in a manner that
alters the fundamental nature of the charges against the accused in a manger
consistent with his or her right to be informed of the charges and to prepare a defense,
that use of Regulation 55 would need to come very early in proceedings, certainly
before the Defense put on its case and the accused took the stand.").
217.
For an indication as to how the timing of use of Regulation 55 may affect
defense strategy, see Katanga Decision on Regulation 55, supra note 6, Minority
Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶1 37-41.
218.
Stahn, supra note 45, at 30.
219.
See Bemba Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b), supra note 102,
¶¶ 201-03 ("[A]s a matter of fairness and expeditiousness of the proceedings, only
distinct crimes may justify a cumulative charging approach and, ultimately, be
confirmed as charges.").
220.
See Katanga Judgment on Appeal, supra note 101, ¶¶ 3-8 (discussing the
procedural history of the case).
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55, inadequately prepares the Pre-Trial Division to make accurate
assessments of the evidence presented and to confirm the correct
charges. 221 Although the defense is permitted to present evidence at
the confirmation hearing, the Prosecutor is not required to disclose
any significant amount of evidence during the pretrial process
preceding the confirmation hearing. 2 22 A more transparent process
mandating mutual and extensive disclosure before the confirmation
hearing would better enable all parties, including the Trial
Chambers, to more accurately assess the evidence and confirm
adequate charges and modes of liability based on the available
evidence. Consequently, the defense would be able to rely on the
charges confirmed after the hearing and be able to effectively prepare
a defense before the beginning of trial.
With more extensive and reliable evidence provided earlier in the
trial process, the likelihood of interlocutory appeals and further
delays would significantly diminish. By emphasizing the preparation
required before the trial begins, the ICC Chambers could avoid the
extensive litigation and filings that invariable arise after the
invocation of Regulation 55. As the War Crimes Research Office
indicates, such cumbersome and lengthy litigation surrounding the
application of Regulation 55 seriously undermines the purported
rationale of the regulation.2 23 It cannot be said that this regulation
still ensures the efficiency of the trial process when it perpetuates
further delays until the resolution of the trial.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In the first twelve years of the ICC, the young institution has
been faced with significant challenges, not the least of which is its
legitimacy and legacy. 224 Of crucial importance to this legacy is the
court's ability to end impunity while simultaneously ensuring the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. However, as the
Katanga case demonstrates, the use of Regulation 55 by the judges of
the ICC can be seen as a sacrifice of the defendants' fair trial rights in
order to avoid a disappointing acquittal. The judges of the ICC PreTrial Division and the Trial Chambers have routinely used

221.

See SACOUTo & CLEARY, EXPEDITING PROCEEDINGS, supra note 171, at 1,

62-63 (describing delays in the disclosure of evidence by the Prosecution due to
sensitive information, necessary redactions, and the protection of witnesses).
222.
See id. at 9; Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 61(5).
223.
See SACOUTo & CLEARY, REGULATION 55, supra note 199, at 1, 53-54
(explaining that the rationale behind the rule was to make trials more efficient by
making it possible for prosecutors to avoid charging every alternative in the
indictment).
224.
See, e.g., Anoushirvani, supra note 12, 214-25 (discussing the ICC's
struggle to achieve legitimacy).
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Regulation 55 to re-characterize the legal qualification of charges
against the accused far after the confirmation hearing authorized the
initial charges against the defendant. 225 Undoubtedly, the defense
relies on the document confirming the charges after the confirmation
hearing to prepare and strategize. 226 However, the judges have
invoked Regulation 55 at such late stages of the trial-on one
occasion during an ongoing trial and another during deliberationsthat there are serious doubts as to the defendant's ability to properly
prepare an adequate defense to the new charges.2 27 There is no doubt
that such late changes have the potential to cause additional delays
in an already length trial process-a serious infringement upon the
defendant's right to a trial without undue delay.
This Note recommends restricting the time and manner in which
Regulation 55 may be invoked, while simultaneously increasing the
transparency of the ICC's pretrial process. It recommended a number
of proposals for the ICC that would serve to more effectively protect
the fair trial rights of the accused while still permitting the court to
achieve its objectives and maintain legitimacy. The ICC, while still in
its early stages as the first international court of its kind, must
seriously reevaluate its current procedural framework to mandate the
protection of such fundamental trial rights in order to sustain
legitimacy and create its legacy.
Margaux Dastugue*

225.
See SACOUTO & CLEARY, REGULATION 55, supra note 199, at 6, 17
(discussing the timing of the Trial Chamber's Regulation 55 notice in the Lubanga and
Bemba cases).
See discussion supraPart VI.A.
226.
227.
See supra Part VI.A.
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